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COMMENTARY
THE MISSING PIECE: A DISCUSSION OF
THEFT, STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS,
AND TITLE DISPUTES IN THE ART
WORLD
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 11, 1987, a buyer paid $53.9 million for Vincent
Van Gogh's painting entitled Irises.1 This price seems particularly
extravagant when one considers that the seller originally purchased
the painting for only $87,000 in 1947.2 Two years later, another
owner sold Pablo Picasso's painting entitled Yo Picasso for $47.85
million.3 While this amount did not break the record sale price
commanded for Van Gogh's painting, the owner did earn $42.02
million on his investment.
4
Such exorbitant sale prices are by no means extraordinary. The
art market as a whole has flourished in recent years. Art sales by the
world's largest auction house, Sotheby Parke-Bernet, rose from
$108 million in 1971-72 to $610 million in 1980-81. 5 In 1987, the
combined sales of Sotheby's and Christie's, the other leading auc-
tion house, totaled more than $2.2 billion.6 By 1988, Sotheby's
gross income alone had topped $2.3 billion.7 Indeed, the art trade
has become a world-wide industry whose gross turnover may be as
high as $50 billion per year.8
This rise in prices, primarily resulting from the growing interest
I Muchnic, Price Shatters Old Mark by More Than $10 Million; Van Gogh Painting 'Irises'
Brings Record $53.9 Million, L.A. Times, Nov. 12, 1987, sec. 1, at 27, col. 1.
2 Hughes, The Anatomy of a Deal; How Alan Bond Bought a $53.9 Million Painting, With
More Than a Little Help, TIME, Nov. 27, 1989, at 66-67.
3 Hughes, Sold!, TIME, Nov. 27, 1989, at 63.
4 Id.
5 Reif, Sotheby's and Cristie's Detail Decline in Sales, N.Y. Times,July 10, 1982, at 11, col.
1.
6 Lee, Greed is Not Just for Profit, FoRBES, Apr. 18, 1988, at 68.
7 Hughes, supra note 3, at 61.
8 Id. at 63; but see Peers, No Sale: Art Market's Boom Comes to Sudden Stop as Buyers Back
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in art as an investment, 9 has fueled the trafficking of stolen art and
artifacts. Scholars have noted this effect:
[T]he publicity surrounding the volume of the art trade, its soaring
prices, the aggressive promotion by auction houses, and the continual
emphasis on the record-breaking sums reached, have done much to
promote cultural property as a lucrative field for dishonest activities,
and to attract illicitly acquired goods to the auction and sales rooms of
the 'art market' states.1 0
By some estimates, the illegal trade in art has become over a $1
billion industry. 1 Indeed, the thriving black market in artworks is
surpassed only by the international illicit drug trade.' 2
Moreover, efforts to control this illegal industry and to protect
cultural property have met with little success. In the international
arena, art-rich countries' attempts to protect their treasures through
unilateral legislation have failed because these countries lack the
political and economic power to protect their property.13 Similarly,
in the national arena, the United States' attempt to control art theft
through the enactment of the National Stolen Property Act
("NSPA") also has met with little success. 14
Faced with the failure of unilateral efforts, art-rich nations his-
torically have banded together, occasionally with the support of art-
acquiring nations such as the United States, to effectuate plans for
Off, Wall St.J., Nov. 15, 1990, sec. A, at 1 (explaining that recent auction sales and prices
suggest that the art market boom is over).
9 Id.; see also Lewis, Pic-ah-so: Why the Japanese Love French Art, NEw REPUB., Nov. 26,
1990, at 17.
10 Prott, International Control of Illicit Movement of the Cultural Heritage: The 1970
UNESCO Convention and Some Possible Alternatives, 10 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 333, 345
(1983).
11 Nafziger, Comments on the Relevance of Law and Culture to Cultural Property Law, 10 SYR.
J. INtr'L L. & COM. 323, 327 (1983) (quoting Salinger, Alias A. John Blake: The Underworld
of the Art World, 118 ABC Closeup 1, 9 (July 16, 1983)); Lambert, Magazine of Art &
Larceny, Wall St. J., July 22, 1988, at 16.
12 See Esterow, Confessions of an Art Cop, ARTNEWS, May 1988, at 134; see also A Special
Agent Speaks Out, ART & AzTIQuEs, Nov. 1986, at 59; Note, Group Rights in Cultural Prop-
erty: Justifying Strict Inalienability, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1179, 1182 (1989).
'3 Partington & Sage, The American Response to the Recovery of Stolen and Illegally Exported
Art: Should the American Courts Look to the Civil Law?, 12 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 395, 397
(1988). Examples of art-rich countries include Italy and Latin American countries such
as Mexico and Peru. Examples of art-acquiring nations include the United States, Can-
ada, Japan, and Switzerland. Although art-acquiring nations produce art, these coun-
tries have the capital surplus to control the international market for valuable art.
14 The NSPA prohibits the transportation "in interstate or foreign commerce [of]
any goods... of the value of $5,000 or more," with the knowledge that such goods were
"stolen, converted or taken by fraud." 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982). The broad application
of this statute has not met with much success, because the property must fall within the
United States' narrow, legal definition of "stolen." Moore, Enforcing Foreign Ownership
Claims in the Antiquities Market, 97 YALE L.J. 466, 472 (1988).
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curbing the illegal exportation and importation of art objects.' 5
However, the differing interests of art-rich and art-acquiring nations
have thwarted such efforts. For instance, of the more than fifty sig-
natories to the Convention of the Means of Prohibiting the Illicit
Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
("UNESCO convention"), only one country, Canada, is considered
an art-acquiring nation.' 6 Thus, since most art-acquiring nations do
not adhere to the convention's regulations, this multilateral effort
has not had great success. 17
The rapid growth of the illicit trafficking of art, combined with
15 For instance, early multilateral agreements, starting with the League of Nations
resolution in 1922, served to protect cultural property during wartime. Prott, supra note
10, at 337. In 1970, the Convention of the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property ("UNESCO Con-
vention") expanded this protection to cultural property during peacetime. See Conven-
tion of the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, No. 11806, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (1972).
The UNESCO Convention provides for the prevention of the export of stolen cul-
tural property from source nations and the import of such property to other nations.
Partington & Sage, supra note 13, at 398. It empowers each nation to establish its own
system of regulatory controls to fulfill the convention's goals. Generally, signatory na-
tions require government authorization, including the issuance of export certificates,
before allowing the export of cultural property. These nations also classify some objects
as ineligible for export. Id.
By 1985, fifty-three nations had become parties to the 1970 convention. Comment,
The Continuing Development of United States Policy Concerning the International Movement of Cul-
tural Property, 4 DICK. J. INrr'L L. 89, 96 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, The Continuing
Development]. By the following year, five more countries had become parties to the con-
vention, although this group did not include any more art-acquiring nations. Merryman,
Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 A.J.I.L. 831, 843 (1986); see also Moustakis,
Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1179
(1989) (noting that such significant art-acquiring nations as Switzerland, Japan, West
Germany, and England have not become signatories of the UNESCO Convention).
The United States became a signatory to the UNESCO Convention in 1983; how-
ever, it terminated its membership on December 31, 1984. Comment, The Continuing
Development, this note, at 98. The United States claimed that UNESCO was mismanaged
and that the United States had become a target for ideological attacks since UNESCO
had begun moving toward the left and had become a forum for non-aligned and Eastern
Bloc nations. Id. Nevertheless, the United States still retains the text of the convention
as its policy regarding the protection of cultural property: See ConventiQn on Cultural
Property Law, title III, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-13 (1982).
16 J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW, ETHics AND THE VIsuAL ARTs 96 (1987). Following
the withdrawal of the United States from the convention in 1984, Canada became the
only art-acquiring signatory. See Merryman, supra note 15, and accompanying text. The
other art-acquiring nations-which include England, Germany, Japan, and Switzer-
land-still have not become members. Id. at 843. For a more thorough discussion of
the UNESCO Convention, see supra note 15.
17 For a more detailed discussion of the inadequacies of the UNESCO Convention,
see Note, Toward Establishing an International Tribunal for the Settlement of Cultural Property
Disputes: How to Keep Greece from Losing Its Marbles, 72 GEo. L.J. 1155, 1160 (1984); Mer-
ryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1881, 1893 (1985).
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the ineffectiveness of both unilateral and multilateral attempts to
protect cultural property, leaves art owners in a precarious position.
Once art objects are stolen, owners often have no other alternative
but to wait for their property to resurface on the art market.18 Even
if stolen art objects reappear, owners are not necessarily guaranteed
the return of their property.
United States courts increasingly face the difficult task of evalu-
ating the claims of original owners of art objects against subsequent
bona fide purchasers of such objects.' 9 In order to reach this issue,
courts have had to address the preliminary issue of whether the ap-
plicable statute of limitations has terminated the original owner's
right to bring an action to recover his or her stolen property. Due
to the difficulty and delay in recovering stolen art, courts have been
reluctant to hold that the applicable statute of limitations bars a
theft victim's right to recover his or her property. Over the years,
courts have employed several distinct doctrines to aid their determi-
nations of whether an original owner can bring suit, beyond the ap-
plicable limitations period, against a bona fide purchaser of his or
her stolen art.20 Early doctrines focused on the actions of subse-
quent purchasers or arbitrary events.21 Conversely, today's reign-
ing doctrine, the discovery rule, focuses solely on the original
owner's actions to determine whether such an owner can bring a
claim.22
This Comment examines the prior doctrines, including the stat-
ute of limitations bar, the adverse possession doctrine, and the de-
mand and refusal rule, employed by courts to determine whether
original owners of stolen art can bring suit against subsequent bona
18 Stolen art typically filters into otherwise legitimate markets. As ex-art-squad
detective Robert Volpe explained, "[u]nless you (the thief) know or have ties to the
legitimate market, you won't be able to make a profit." Esterow, supra note 12, at 135.
19 See, e.g., DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1056 (1988); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aft'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990);
O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 NJ. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980); Porter v. Wertz, 68 A.D.2d 141,
416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1979), aft'd, 53 N.Y.2d 696, 439 N.Y.S.2d 105, 421 N.E.2d 500
(1981); Menzel v. List, 22 A.D.2d 647, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1st Dept. 1964), on remand, 49
Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified on other grounds, 28 A.D.2d 516,
279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1st Dept. 1967), modification rev'd, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979,
246 N.E.2d 742 (1969).
20 See, e.g., Rabinof v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 830 (1971) (adverse possession);
Menzel, 22 A.D.2d 647, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43 (demand and refusal rule); O'Keeffe, 83 NJ. 478,
416 A.2d 862 (discovery rule).
21 For a thorough discussion of the adverse possession doctrine and the demand and
refusal rule, see infra notes 48-83 and accompanying text.




fide purchasers regardless of the expiration of the applicable limita-
tions period. This Comment notes the reasons why these doctrines
are becoming obsolete. It also discusses the evolution and applica-
tion of today's reigning doctrine, the discovery rule.
This Comment recognizes that, at first glance, the discovery
rule appears to provide the most equitable method for resolving
whether original owners can bring suit to recover their stolen prop-
erty beyond the expiration of the limitations period. Nevertheless,
this Comment determines that the discovery rule places a tremen-
dous burden on present possessors and original owners, because
the courts have not established objective standards of conduct for
possessors and owners to follow. Moreover, this Comment argues
that the current doctrine promotes an inefficient method for deter-
mining whether an individual may bring a legal claim once the limi-
tations period expires. This Comment also argues that the current
method fails to discourage art theft effectively. Finally, this Com-
ment argues that the implementation of the discovery rule creates
an irreconcilable conflict with the previously-established legal no-
tion that a thief does not obtain good title to stolen property.
Therefore, given the shortcomings of the discovery rule, this
Comment concludes that courts must re-evaluate their use of this
doctrine. Rather than employing the doctrine in its present form,
courts should amend the discovery rule to establish a more efficient
and more equitable rule which places the burden of action equally
upon the original owner and the subsequent purchaser of stolen art.
II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The civil action of replevin constitutes the primary means of
securing a stolen painting's return from a bona fide purchaser.23 As
23 See R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 4.1, at 33 (3d ed. 1975). An
action in replevin is:
an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels
may recover these goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or
taken or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1299 (6th ed. 1990). See Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127
(D.C. Pa. 1971), vacated, Parham v. Cortese, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Jim's Furniture Mart,
Inc. v. Harris, 42 Ill. App. 3d 488, 356 N.E.2d 175 (1976).
Another common method of securing the return of property is the tort action of
conversion. Conversion protects owners from major interferences with their chattel or
with their rights to said chattel. To determine the severity of the interference and
whether justice requires the defendant to pay full value for the chattel under a forced
judicial sale, courts consider all the relevant factors of a case, including:
the extent and duration of the defendant's exercise of control over the chattel; the
defendant's good faith or bad intention; the extent and duration of the resulting
interference with the plaintiff's right of control; the harm done to the chattel; and
the expense and inconvenience caused to the plaintiff.
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with all civil actions, the requirement that the original owner file his
or her claim within the established statute of limitations period re-
stricts this right.24 As a general rule, the expiration of the estab-
lished limitations period precludes the original owner's right to sue
the subsequent bona fide purchaser of his or her stolen property in
replevin, and vests ownership status in that bona fide purchaser.2 5
To judge if a statute of limitations bars a particular claim, one
must understand the policy goals behind both the limitation and the
accrual of the cause of action, which is the event that marks the time
when the limitations period begins to run. Statutes of limitations do
not intend either to shield wrongdoers or to provide them with
peace of mind concerning potential liability. 26 Rather, the rationale
behind statutes of limitations is the realization that the passage of
time can make the prosecution of delayed claims burdensome and
unfair.27 A limitations period prevents unfairness to a defendant by
relieving her of the burden of defending lawsuits after she has en-
joyed a substantial period of repose and during which time evidence
may have been lost, destroyed or manufactured, memories may have
faded, and important witnesses may have died or disappeared. 28
Statutes of limitations also serve a punitive function by depriv-
ing a plaintiff of the right to sue if he or she does not bring a claim
promptly to court.29 Part of the rationalization for this function
rests upon the image of the prospective plaintiff as a "sleeping
claimant" who intentionally or negligently postpones bringing an
action.30 This rationalization presumes that those who have valid
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 15, at 90
(5th ed. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222(a) (1957).
24 Today, every state has comprehensive statutes establishing limitations periods for
substantially all actions arising by virtue of statutory or common law principles. Most
federally created rights of action also have specific statutes of limitations. For a general
compilation of these statutes, see 4 AM. JUR. Trials and Statutes of Limitations § 5.5 (1966).
25 See R. BROWN, supra note 23, at 33.
26 Comment, The Evolution of Illinois Tort Statutes of Limitation: Where Are We Going and
Why?, 53 Cm. KENT L. REV. 673, 699 (1977) [hereinafter Comment, Evolution of Illinois
Tort Statutes] (citing Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 6 Ill. 2d 129, 137, 334 N.E.2d 160, 164 (1975); Romano v. Westinghouse Elec. Co.,
336 A.2d 555, 560 (R.I. 1976)).
27 See Williams, Limitation Periods on Personal Injury Claims, 48 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
881, 884 (1973).
28 See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Order of R.R. Te-
legraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944); Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950).
29 Statutes of limitation "stimulate litigants to prosecute their causes of action dili-
gently .... They penalize dilatoriness and serve as a measure of repose." Rosenau v.
New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 136, 238 A.2d 169, 172 (1968).
30 Comment, Evolution of Illinois Tort Statutes, supra note 26, at 676; see also Phoebe v.
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causes of actions will not delay in asserting them.31
Typical statutes of limitations provide that courts compute the
period within which a plaintiff can bring an action from the time the
"cause of action" accrues. Unfortunately, most statutes are disturb-
ingly vague regarding how to determine the accrual time of a limita-
tions period.3 2 While state legislatures typically designate the
length of a limitations period, they tend to leave the responsibility
for determining when the accrual period begins to the courts.
33
Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained:
Although New Jersey's Legislature has provided that every action at
law for injury to the person shall be brought within two years after the
cause of action shall have accrued, it has... never sought to define or
specify when a cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued within
the meaning of the statute .... "
Yet, even where the statute of limitation clearly defines the ac-
crual period, courts have ruled that the literal language of such stat-
utes should yieldl to other considerations. Courts have recognized
that the application of an absolute bar can create the adverse effect
of removing the legal remedy for a meritorious claim.35 Courts
therefore have claimed that in each case, they must identify, evalu-
ate, and weigh the equity claims of opposing parties.3 6 Primarily,
courts have employed two methods to avoid giving effect to statutes
of limitations that act to bar potentially just claims: (1) case-by-case
Jay, 1 Ill. 268, 273 (1820) (statutes of limitations "favor the diligent and not the
slothful").
31 See Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. 386, 390 (1868).
32 Rather than specifying a definite time or event marking the beginning of the
period for each type of action, the typical statute of limitations provides rather gen-
erally that the period shall be computed from the time the cause of action accrues.
Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art: Of Paintings, Statutes, and Statutes of Limitations, 27
UCLA L. Rav. 1122, 1128 (1980) [hereinafter Comment, Recovery of Stolen Art]. See, e.g.,
CAL. R. Crv. P. § 312 (West 1954) (requiring that an existing right to bring a cause of
action cannot be summarily cut off without giving the parties a reasonable time to exer-
cise that right, but what constitutes a reasonable time is not defined).
33 Courts have relied upon various rules to determine when an accrual period begins.
Examples of such rules include starting the running of the limitations period: (1) from
the time of the wrongful taking or possession for actions in replevin; and (2) from the
commission of the tortious act for actions in tort. See Comment, Recovery of Stolen Art,
supra note 32, at 1129-30.
34 Fernandi v. Strully, 35 NJ. 434, 449, 173 A.2d 277, 285 (1961).
35 Comment, Battle Over a Monet The Requirement of Due Diligence in a Lawsuit by the
Owner Against a Good Faith Purchaser and Possessor, 9 Loy. ENT. L.J. 57, 62 (1989). The
harshness of the traditional, strict application of statutes of limitations has met with se-
vere criticism, particularly in the medical malpractice area. See, e.g., Petersen, The Undis-
covered Cause of Action and the Statute of Limitations: A Right Without a Remedy in Illinois, 58
ILi.. B.J. 644 (1970); Comment, Limitations in Professional Malpractice Actions, 28 MD. L
Rv. 47 (1968).
36 See, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 62 NJ. 267, 274, 300 A.2d 563, 567 (1973).
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determinations whether to remove the bar based upon policy con-
siderations;3 7 and (2) conclusions that the cause of action did not
accrue until a relatively recent date.
38
Courts generally have preferred to avoid the statute of limita-
tion bar by employing the second method. This method consists of
judicial manipulation of the definition of the "accrual" of a cause of
action.3 9 Because legislatures often have left this matter unde-
cided, 40 in cases where a plaintiff legitimately is ignorant of his or
her right to sue, courts have altered the definition of the accrual of a
cause of action. In such cases, courts have defined the accrual of a
cause of action as the time of its discovery, rather than the tradition-
ally accepted standard that the cause of action accrues upon the
commission of the tortious act.4 1
Like most replevin actions, the cause of action for the recovery
of stolen art traditionally accrued at the time of the wrongful taking,
and not upon the discovery of the identity of the party in possession
of the property. However, due to the growing recognition of the
difficulty of discovering who possesses stolen property and the ease
with which individuals can hide property, the judiciary has manipu-
lated the statute of limitations bar to expand plaintiffs' rights to
bring such claims beyond the expiration of the applicable limitations
37 Comment, Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 32, at 1132. This method of creating an
exception to statutes of limitation focuses on the policy of allowing a potential plaintiff
to bring an action when, through no fault of his or her own, the plaintiff has been kept
ignorant of his or her ability to sue. In such cases, courts often conclude that the obvi-
ous injustice to the plaintiff outweighs the broader policy considerations favoring the
defendant.
38 Id. at 1132-33.
39 See, e.g., Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970);
Fernandi v. Strully, 35 NJ. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961).
40 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
41 In Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital, for example, the Illinois Supreme Court fol-
lowed this line of reasoning. 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970). In Lipsey, the plaintiff
brought an action against her doctor, who had failed to diagnose properly her excised
tumor as malignant. Id. After removing the plaintiff's arm, shoulder, and breast for
malignancies, the doctor reexamined his original biopsy and discovered the error that
he had made in diagnosing the biopsy three years before. Id. at 34-35, 262 N.E.2d at
452. In the plaintiff's subsequent malpractice action, the court focused upon the doc-
tor's defense that the plaintiff had not brought her action within the two year limitation
period because the statute began to run from the time of the alleged negligence. Id. at
37, 262 N.E.2d at 453. The court disagreed with the defendant's argument and decided
that, in medical malpractice cases, the cause of action accrued when the harmed individ-
ual learned of her injury or reasonably should have learned of it. Id. at 39, 262 N.E.2d at
455. By reaching this conclusion, the court joined "a 'wave of decisions' favoring [this]
rule of time of discovery." Id. at 40, 262 N.E.2d at 455 (citations omitted). See also
Fernandi, 35 NJ. at 451, 173 A.2d at 286 (limitation period began to run when the plain-
tiff knew or had reason to know about the foreign object left in her body during surgery




Judicial treatment of this conflict between the statute of limita-
tion bar and the difficulty of locating stolen property has not been
uniform. Many courts have expanded plaintiffs' rights to bring ac-
tions by implying that knowledge of who possesses one's art begins
the accrual period.43 Other courts have expanded plaintiffs' rights
by employing judicially-created doctrines in order to achieve equita-
ble results. Such courts have granted or denied relief based upon
uneven applications of corollary doctrines such as fraudulent con-
cealment,44 adverse possession,45 the demand and refusal rule,
46
and, most recently, the discovery rule.47
III. COROLLARY DOCTRINES
A. ADVERSE POSSESSION
In addition to relying upon the expiration of the statute of limi-
tations, courts have considered the transfer of title to property via
the doctrine of adverse possession when determining whether an
original owner can bring legal action to recover stolen property.4
8
The historical doctrine of disseisin explains the origin of this usage
of adverse possession.49 Traditionally, before the statute of limita-
tion expired, the possessor had the property and the right to keep it
unless the original owner claimed it. Hence, the only imperfection
in the possessor's right to retain that property was the original
owner's right to repossess it. Once the running of the limitation
period removed this imperfection, the possessor had good title to
the property for all purposes.50
At first glance, one might think that the statute of limitations
and the adverse possession doctrine merely work together to deter-
mine whether an owner can bring an action to recover his stolen
property from a subsequent purchaser. Indeed, the two doctrines
42 For examples of these cases, see supra note 19.
43 See Stoner v. Carr, 97 Idaho 641, 550 P.2d 259 (1976).
44 See Jackson v. American Credit Bureau, Inc., 23 Ariz. App. 199, 202, 531 P.2d 932,
934 (1975).
45 See infra notes 48-65 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 66-83 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 84-127 and accompanying text.
48 See C. SMrrH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 157-58 (1971); R.
BROWN, supra note 23, at 33.
49 Under the doctrine of disseisin, courts treated a wrongful possessor, as long as her
possession continued, as the owner, and the dispossessed occupant was considered
merely to have a personal right to attempt to recapture his property. O'Keeffe v. Sny-
der, 83 NJ. 478, 500, 416 A.2d 862, 874 (1980) (quoting R. BROWN, supra note 23, at
34).
50 Id. (citing Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels, 3 HARV. L. REV. 313, 321 (1890)).
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are inextricably linked: beyond barring the owner's right to main-
tain legal proceedings to recover his property, the running of the
limitations period has the added effect of transferring title to the
property to the subsequent possessor when employed under the ad-
verse possession doctrine.5 1 However, the application of the ad-
verse possession doctrine provides several advantages over a
straight application of the statute of limitation bar.
The statute of limitation focuses upon the length of an individ-
ual's possession to determine the accrual time of the cause of action.
Unlike this doctrine, adverse possession focuses upon the character
of the defendant's possession to determine the accrual of an action
in replevin. Where an individual holds the peaceable, undisturbed,
and open possession of property under an assertion of ownership,
the running of the limitations period confers good title upon her,
even against the original owner.52 The defendant asserting such ti-
tle by adverse possession bears the burden of proving the existence
of each element of the doctrine by clear and convincing evidence.
53
Moreover, the limitation period does not begin to run until the
claimant satisfies each required element of the adverse possession
doctrine.5
4
For example, in Rabinofv. United States, the court refused to pass
title to a violin from the owner of record to the defendant possessor,
because the defendant could not demonstrate the fulfillment of all
51 R. BROWN, supra note 23, at 33 (footnotes omitted).
52 Rabinofv. United States, 329 F. Supp. 830, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Lightfoot v. Da-
vis, 198 N.Y. 261,267,91 N.E. 582, 583 (1910). See also Reid v. New York, 274 N.Y. 178,
8 N.E.2d 326 (1937); Monnot v. Murphy, 207 N.Y. 240, 100 N.E. 742 (1913). For a
court to confer title on a possessor of property, the possessor must demonstrate: "1)
actual, 2) open and notorious, 3) exclusive, 4) continuous, and 5) hostile [possession]
under a claim of right." Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79
Nw. U.L. REV. 1122, 1123 (1984-85) (footnotes omitted). Actual possession requires
that the possessor demonstrate the ability to control the property in question and the
intent to exclude others from such control. Open and notorious possession requires
that one's possession be so conspicuous that this possession generally is known to the
public. Exclusive possession requires that the possessor holds possession of the prop-
erty for himself and/or that he maintains sole dominion over the property and its appro-
priation for his sole use and benefit. Continuous possession requires that the possessor
maintain the uninterrupted possession of the property for the full period designated by
the pertinent statute of limitations. Finally, hostile possession requires that the posses-
sor intend to dispossess the true owner and the rest of the world. See 3 AM. JUR. 2D
Adverse Possession § 202 (1986); 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 60 (1972); Annotation, Effect of
Public Use on Adverse Possession, 56 A.L.R. 3D 1182 (1974); 7 R. POWELL & P. RoHAN, Pow-
ELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 1012 (Supp. 1990); R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHIT-
MAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.7, at 758 (1984).




of the adverse possession doctrine's requirements. 55 Although the
defendant demonstrated that his possession had been open, notori-
ous and exclusive, he did not demonstrate that his possession of the
violin had been hostile to the rights of the owner of record.56
Thus, while the statute of limitation relies upon an arbitrary
time period to determine whether an owner can bring suit to re-
cover his stolen property from a subsequent purchaser, adverse pos-
session focuses upon the possessor's fulfillment of several factors
demonstrating the character of his possession. This focus better
protects original owners, because the doctrine places more stringent
requirements on subsequent possessors.57
Traditionally, the doctrine of adverse possession applied to
claims involving the acquisition of titles to land.58 However, it also
is well-settled that a possessor may acquire title to chattels by ad-
verse possession.59 Thus, given the advantages of the adverse pos-
session doctrine over the statute of limitation and the doctrine's
applicability to chattels, the judiciary has employed the adverse pos-
session doctrine when addressing claims by original owners against
subsequent possessors of their chattels.60
While the application of the adverse possession doctrine to
chattels treats owners more fairly than a similar application of the
statute of limitations, its application still risks great injustice and ar-
bitrariness. An inherent problem with many kinds of personal prop-
erty is that it always is debatable whether an individual has openly,
visibly, and notoriously possessed such property.6 1 This problem is
particularly acute with respect to works of art. Like many types of
55 Id at 843.
56 Id. Rabinof's use of the violin was not hostile, because the owner originally gave
him permission to use it. Id. at 842. For an explanation of the requirements of adverse
possession, see infra note 57.
57 Under adverse possession, the possessor must act deliberately to obtain perma-
nent possession of the property rather than passively awaiting the passage of the arbi-
trary time limit designated by the statute of limitation. Furthermore, adverse possession
can lengthen the limitations period by introducing additional elements to the cause of
action which the possessor must demonstrate before the action can accrue. Comment,
Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 32, at 1141. These requirements give original owners
more time to locate and recover their property.
58 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 1012-27 (R. Powell & P. Rohan abr. eds. 1968).
59 J. BRUCE, J. ELY & C. BosTrcx, MODERN PROPERTY LAW 669 (1984); see also 3 AM.
JUR. 2D Adverse Possession § 12 (1986); 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitations of Actions § 90 (1986).
60 See, e.g., Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1855) (recognizing the right to adversely
possess property); In re Estate of Wright, 192 F. Supp. 812 (1961) (finding decedent's
possession of the superficiary house for over fifty years entitled her to be adjudged its
owner by adverse possession).
61 Partington & Sage, supra note 13, at 415. For a discussion of the elements of ad-
verse possession, see supra note 57.
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personal property, one can readily move and easily conceal art ob-
jects. Therefore, either an original owner must overcome the prac-
tically insurmountable task of attempting to locate his stolen
property, which may be displayed privately, or the present posses-
sor, to prove open and notorious possession, must publicly display
the art object in question.
Given this inherent problem, the New Jersey Supreme Court
recognized the need to replace the adverse possession doctrine in
O'Keeffe v. Snyder.62 In that case, the defendant displayed O'Keeffe's
paintings in his home.63 Rather than attempting to manipulate the
standard for determining whether the defendant's possession of the
paintings was sufficiently open and notorious under the adverse
possession doctrine, the court adopted a new rule focusing on the
plaintiff's actions.64 Many courts have followed O'Keeffe and dis-
pensed with the adverse possession doctrine.65 These courts have
employed other judicially-created doctrines to determine whether
an original owner can bring an action against a subsequent bona
fide purchaser for the recovery of his stolen property.
B. THE DEMAND AND REFUSAL DOCTRINE
Unsatisfied with the adverse possession doctrine's ability to
curb the potential injustice of a mechanical application of the statute
of limitations bar, some courts have relied upon the judicially-cre-
ated demand and refusal rule to measure the accrual time of a cause
of action. Under this doctrine, to commence an action to recover
stolen property from a bona fide purchaser, an original owner must
prove that the purchaser refused, upon demand, to return the prop-
62 83 NJ. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980). Courts also have disapproved of the adverse
possession doctrine, because it solely focuses upon the possessor's actions. See supra
notes 52 and 57 and accompanying text.
63 O'Keefe, 83 NJ. at 486, 416 A.2d at 866.
64 Id. at 496-97, 416 A.2d at 872.
In recognizing the potential unfairness to both parties of determining ownership on
the grounds of whether the defendant had open and notorious possession of the paint-
ings, the court remarked:
O'Keeffe argues that nothing short of public display should be sufficient to alert the
true owner and start the statute running. Although there is merit in that contention
from the perspective of the original owner, the effect is to impose a heavy burden
on the purchasers of paintings who wish to enjoy the paintings in the privacy of
their homes.
Id. at 496, 416 A.2d at 871. For a more thorough discussion of O'Keefe, see infra notes
99-107 and accompanying text.
65 See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feld-
man Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.
1990); DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056
(1988); Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
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erty in question. 66
Until the original owner demands the return of her property,
one cannot consider the innocent purchaser's possession wrongful
or unlawful. Since the purchaser has had no notice of a claim, the
demand serves to establish that the purchaser wrongfully has re-
tained the original owner's property.67 Informing the purchaser of
the defect in the title affords the purchaser the opportunity to return
the property to the original owner before a court holds him liable.68
Menzel v. List 6 9 constitutes the quintessential example of the ju-
diciary's use of the demand and refusal rule in its attempt to manip-
ulate the accrual time of the applicable statute of limitations. In
Menzel, the plaintiff and her husband left a painting by renowned
artist Marc Chagall in their apartment in Brussels when they fled
from the Nazis in 1941.70 The plaintiff subsequently settled in the
United States, and once the war ended, began searching for the
painting.7' She finally located it in the defendant's possession in
1962. The plaintiff demanded its return, the defendant refused, and
the plaintiff then filed an action for replevin.72
As one of his five defenses, the defendant claimed that the stat-
ute of limitations for the plaintiff's action had expired, because
fourteen years had passed between the time when the plaintiff as-
serted that the Nazis had stolen the painting and the time when the
defendant bought the painting.73 The court quickly dispensed with
this defense, stating that for actions in replevin, as well as in conver-
sion, the cause of action against a bona fide purchaser arose upon
the defendant's refusal to convey the chattel on demand, rather than
upon the stealing or the taking of that chattel.74
Courts have considered such a demand for the return of stolen
property a substantive, rather than a procedural, part of the cause of
action. 75 This distinction has played a particularly important role in
the determination of whether an owner can bring a suit to recover
stolen property, because it assures that the limitations period will
66 Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981),
af'd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982); Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28 (1874).
67 See Butler v. Wolf Sussman, Inc., 221 Ind. 47, 50, 46 N.E.2d 243, 244 (1943).
68 Gillt, 57 N.Y at 34.
69 22 A.D.2d 647, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1963), on remand, 49 Misc. 2d 30%, 267 N.Y.S.2d
804 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified on other grounds, 28 A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Ist Dept.
1967), modification rev'd, 24 N.Y. 91, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979, 246 N.E.2d 74 (1969).
70 Id. at 301, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
71 Id. at 301, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 304, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
74 Id. at 304-05, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
75 See idJ; Dickinson v. Mayor of New York, 92 N.Y. 584, 590 (1st Dept. 1880).
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not begin to run until the owner actually demands that the posses-
sor return the property.76 Courts consider demands procedural
when the demand constitutes a condition for bringing the action but
not an essential part of the action.77 Unlike substantive demands,
procedural demands provide for the accrual of the cause of action at
"the time the right to make the demand is complete."7 Hence,
considering the demand a substantive part of the action extends the
period before the accrual of the action from the time when the ob-
ject is stolen to the time when the owner demands its return.
The Menzel court's determination that such a demand for the
return of an art object constituted a substantive part of the cause of
action has served as the basis for similar determinations in later pro-
ceedings. For example, citing Menzel, the Second Circuit recognized
that the original owner of a stolen painting by Claude Monet had
the undisputable duty, among other duties, to demand its return
before the court would toll the applicable statute of limitations.
79
The Menzel courts's demand and refusal rule better protects the
interests of original owners than the adverse possession doctrine,
because owners have the opportunity to take action to recover their
stolen property. Yet, this rule also has met with a storm of criticism
due to its harsh treatment of innocent purchasers. Principally, the
Menzel doctrine "reduces the repose of innocent purchasers to a nul-
lity" by allowing aggrieved owners to bring causes of action, regard-
less of the passage of the statute of limitations' designated time
limit, as long as the owner meets the demand requirement.8 0 More-
over, if the possessor is a wrongful taker or a purchaser with know-
ledge, courts should not require a demand, because the possessor
already has notice of his wrongful retention of the original owner's
property.8 1 Because the demand requirement in this instance would
not constitute a substantive part of the cause of action, the statute of
limitations presumably would begin running immediately in favor of
the purchaser upon his taking possession of the chattel. Thus, the
demand and refusal rule could lead to the anomalous result of
76 Menzel, 22 A.D.2d at 647, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
77 Dickinson, 92 N.Y. at 590.
78 Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 848 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(quoting N.Y. Civ. PRac. L. & R. § 206(a) (McKinney 1990)).
79 DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056
(1988); see also Kunsisammiungen Zu Weimar, 536 F. Supp. at 848 (museum's cause of ac-
tion to recover its Duerer paintings, which were stolen during World War II, did not
accrue when the American citizen purchased the paintings, but instead accrued when the
American refused, upon demand, to return them).
80 Comment, Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 32, at 1140.
81 Id. at 1139.
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favoring a bad faith possessor, or a thief, over a good faith posses-
sor. 82 For these reasons, many states have rejected Menzel's rule of
accrual because it leads to results contrary to public policy. 83
C. THE DISCOVERY RULE
Increasingly, courts have employed the judicially-created dis-
covery rule. This rule tolls the running of the limitation period until
the injured party, by the exercise of due diligence, discovers or rea-
sonably should have discovered the facts constituting the basis of his
claim.84 Properly interpreted, courts have intended to use the dis-
covery rule as a vehicle for acknowledging equitable considerations
when applying statutes of limitations.85 Like most equitable doc-
trines, such as those discussed previously, it developed as a means
of mitigating the often harsh results of a rigid adherence to a strict
application of the statute of limitations.
86
Under this rubric, courts have claimed that the discovery rule
functions as a balancing test between the defendant's legitimate
aims of repose87 and the hardship to the plaintiff of having a claim
barred even though she reasonably could not have known that she
had a claim until after the limitations period expired.88 To satisfy
82 Id.; see also DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 108 (delay of original owner's demand also delays
accrual of the cause of action; thus, the good faith purchaser will remain exposed to suit
long after an action against a thief or a bad faith purchaser would be time barred).
83 Comment, Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 32, at 1139. See, e.g., Harpending v.
Meyer, 55 Cal. 555 (1880); see also Stroganoff-Scherbatoff v. Weldon, 420 F. Supp. 181
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). In Stroganoff-Scherbatoff, the Southern District of New York carried its
argument against the application of the demand and refusal rule beyond such policy
considerations. The court never actually reached the statute of limitations issue, be-
cause it dismissed the case on other grounds. However, in dicta, the court noted certain
statutory language apparently overlooked by the Menzel court, which provided that
courts must measure the limitations period from the time when the right to make a
demand was completed. The Menzel court, on the other hand, held that the cause of
action accrued when the plaintiff demanded the return of his property and the defendant
refused.
Courts also have disapproved of the demand and refusal doctrine because it encour-
ages possessors to conceal art objects. See supra III.B.
84 O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 499, 416 A.2d 862, 870 (1980). As summarized
by Justice Handler:
When a party is either unaware that he has sustained an injury or, although aware
that an injury has occurred, he does not know that it is, or may be, attributable to
the fault of another, the cause of action does not accrue until the discovery of the
injury or the facts suggesting the fault of another person.
Id.
85 Id. at 498, 416 A.2d at 869.
86 Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 273-74, 300 A.2d 563, 566 (1973).
87 For a more thorough discussion of the statute of limitation's purpose of protecting
defendants, see supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
88 Lopez, 62 N.J. at 274, 300 A.2d at 566-67; see also Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 611
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this equitable obligation, courts have considered all aspects of a case
relevant to the determination of the accrual time. Hence, advocates
of the discovery rule claim that the meaning of "due diligence" and
its application have varied according to the facts of each case.8 9 The
party claiming the indulgence of the rule traditionally has borne the
burden of proving such relevant factors and circumstances as:
the nature of the alleged injury, the availability of witnesses and writ-
ten evidence, the length of time that has elapsed since the alleged
wrongdoing, whether the delay has been to any extent deliberate or
intentional, [and] whether the delay may be said to have peculiarly or
unusually prejudiced the defendant.90
The discovery rule first appeared in the medical malpractice
area in 1917,9 1 but it was not considered a potent theory until its
adoption by the California Supreme Court in 1936.92 In 1961, the
New Jersey Supreme Court brought attention to this vital, yet still
relatively obscure, doctrine by applying it in a medical malpractice
case.93 Although the holding in that case expressly confined the dis-
covery rule to foreign object malpractice actions, subsequent deci-
sions have recognized the pertinence of the doctrine in a host of
other contexts, including those in which the plaintiff remained igno-
rant of the entire cause of action.94
With time, courts, led by the New Jersey Supreme Court, have
recognized that a rule requiring reasonable diligence in attempting
to locate stolen property is especially appropriate with respect to
(7th Cir. 1986); Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill. 2d 161, 167-168, 421 N.E.2d
864, 867 (1981); Rozney v. Marowl, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 70, 250 N.E.2d 656, 664 (1969);
Franzese, "Georgia on my Mind" - Reflections on O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 19 SETON HALL L. REV.
1, 8-9 (1989); Comment, Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 32, at 1151.
89 O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 499, 416 A.2d at 873.
90 Id.
91 Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917) (plaintiff's cause of action
began to run at the time of her discovery of her doctor's negligence in treating her
stomach condition).
92 Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936) (finding that the plaintiff did
not and could not have discovered through due diligence the drainage tube left in her
body by her surgeon); see Comment, Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 32, at 674 n.10.
93 Fernandi v. Strully, 35 NJ. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961) (statute of limitations should
not have commenced running until the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the pres-
ence of a wingnut left in her abdomen following surgery).
94 Comment, Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 32, at 1153. See, e.g., Diamond v. New
Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 51 N.J. 594, 596-97, 242 A.2d 622, 624 (1968) (negligent
installation of an underground conduit); Brown v. College of Medicine and Dentistry,
167 NJ. Super. 532, 536-37, 401 A.2d 288, 290-91 (1979) (breach of union's duty to
fairly represent bargaining unit); Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc., 61 111. 2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975) (defamation); Praznik v. Sport
Aero, Inc., 42 Ill. App. 2d 330, 355 N.E.2d 686 (1976) (wrongful death action).
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stolen art.95 Although art often is kept in private collections, courts
advocating the discovery rule claim that investigations can uncover
the whereabouts of such property.96 Discovery is possible because
art loses its value if altered and those who see valuable art objects
tend to remember them. Thus, owners of stolen art have a better
chance of succeeding in their investigations, and ultimately recover-
ing their property, than most owners of stolen property. 97
With respect to stolen art, the use of the discovery rule has de-
veloped slowly. 98 In the few cases where courts have chosen to em-
ploy the discovery rule, they repeatedly have relied upon the 1980
case O'Keeffe v. Snyder 99 as authority for the doctrine's application. 100
In O'Keeffe, the renowned artist Georgia O'Keeffe alleged that in
1946, several of her paintings disappeared from a cooperative gal-
lery exhibiting her work. 10' O'Keeffe never reported the disappear-
ance to the local police department or any other law enforcement
agency, never attempted to obtain a reimbursement from an insur-
ance agency since she had not insured the paintings, nor advertised
the loss in any publication.' 0 2 She did discuss it, however, with as-
sociates in the art world. Finally, in 1972, she reported the theft to
the Art Dealers Association of America, Inc.'s recently-created reg-
istry of stolen paintings.' 0 3 In 1975, O'Keeffe learned that Barry
Snyder, a gallery owner in New Jersey, possessed the paintings.
When Snyder refused her demand that he return the paintings, she
95 See, e.g., O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 NJ. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980); Autocephalous
Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp.
1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aft'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990); DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836
F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).
96 IL at 109; see Feldman & Burnham, An Art Archive: Principles and Realization, 10
CONN. L. REV. 702, 724 (1978) (French and Italian authorities credit art registries and
investigation efforts for recovery rates as high as 757o). Other authorities disagree with
this estimate. See Esterow, supra note 12, at 134.
97 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 109.
98 Part of the reason for the slow development and expansion of the discovery rule is
that matters requiring its application rarely are litigated. Franzese, supra note 88, at 16.
99 83 NJ. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
100 Franzese, supra note 88, at 18 (O'Keeffe's principle legacy to date may reside in its
value as precedent for the continued expansion of the discovery rule). See also DeWeerth,
836 F.2d at 103; Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feld-
man Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.
1990).
101 O'Keeffe, 83 NJ. at 484, 416 A.2d at 865. The defendant's factual contentions in
this case were inconsistent with O'Keeffe's allegations of theft in 1946. The dealer who
sold the paintings to the defendant traced his possession to his father. Claiming a family
relationship with O'Keeffe's husband, a relationship which O'Keeffe denied, the dealer
recalled seeing the paintings in his father's apartment in New Hampshire as early as
1941-1943, a time period preceding the alleged theft. Id. at 486, 416 A.2d at 866.




instituted an action in replevin. 04
With 0'Keeffe, the New Jersey Supreme Court became the first
court to adopt the discovery rule with respect to stolen art.10 5 The
court found that the introduction of equitable considerations
through the discovery rule provided a more satisfactory response
than adverse possession.1 06 The rule would permit "an artist who
use[d] reasonable efforts to report, investigate, and recover a paint-
ing to preserve the rights of title and possession."10 7 The continued
expansion of the discovery rule with regard to art theft has de-
pended upon the New Jersey Supreme Court's conclusion that the
discovery rule more equitably responds to the problem of stolen art
than previously employed doctrines.
Most recently, the District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana followed the New Jersey Supreme Court's lead by applying
the discovery rule to an action to recover stolen art.10 8 In Autocepha-
lous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc., the court determined the ownership of four Byzantine mosa-
ics' 0 9 which were removed from the Church of the Panagia
Kanakaria ("Kanakaria Church") during the Turkish military occu-
pation of Cyprus in the 1970's. 10 Discovering, in 1979, that the
mosaics of the Kanakaria Church were missing,"' the Republic of
104 Id. at 486, 416 A.2d at 866.
105 Id. at 478, 416 A.2d at 862.
106 Id. at 499, 416 A.2d at 872.
107 Id. at 498, 416 A.2d at 872.
108 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit recently affirmed this decision. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox
Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
109 The mosaics, created in the early sixth century, originally were part of a larger
mosaic, affixed to the apse of the Church of the Panagia Kanakaria, depictingJesus as a
young boy seated in the lap of the Virgin Mary. The large mosaic deteriorated over the
centuries, so that all that remained were the four mosaics depicting the figure of Jesus
and the busts of the North Archangel and two apostles. The court considered these
mosaics of "invaluable and irreplaceable significance to Cyprus's [sic] cultural, artistic,
and religious heritage." Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus, 717 F. Supp. at
1378.
110 In 1963, civil disturbances broke out between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the
young, independent republic of Cyprus. Turkish military forces invaded Cyprus in 1974
and began a military occupation of the northern 37% of the island. The Turkish military
established a government in this region which no nation, other than Turkey, recognizes
as legitimate. Id.
S11 Since the Turkish invasion in 1974, the government of the republic of Cyprus and
the Church of Cyprus have been denied access to the occupied Northern region of the
island where the Kanakaria Church is located. However, the Department of Antiquities
of the Republic of Cyprus received reports from visitors allowed access to the occupied
area that the Kanakaria Church was vandalized and the mosaics forcibly removed from
the apse. Id. at 1379.
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Cyprus sought the mosaics' recovery by contacting and requesting
assistance from a host of organizations including UNESCO, the In-
ternational Council of Museums, individual American and European
museums, international auction houses, and Harvard University's
Dumbarton Oaks Institute for Byzantine Studies.
112
In 1989, the Republic of Cyprus finally discovered that Peg
Goldberg, of Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc. in Indianapolis,
Indiana, possessed the mosaics. 113 Goldberg, an art dealer who
dealt almost exclusively in nineteenth and twentieth century
works,"t 4 acquired the mosaics in Europe through a Dutch art dealer
and a California attorney.115 All the information Goldberg received
regarding the mosaics came from these men. 1 6 These men told
Goldberg that the seller supposedly found the mosaics in the rubble
of an "extinct" church in northern Cyprus while serving there as a
Turkish archaeologist.' 
17
On Goldberg's request, the attorney met with the seller and de-
termined that the mosaics had been properly exported from north-
ern Cyprus.1 8 Goldberg then negotiated an agreement for the sale
of the mosaics for $1.08 million, with the attorney and the art dealer
serving as two of the three middlemen for the deal. 119 Goldberg
then returned with the mosaics to the United States.' 2
0
When Goldberg refused their demand that she return the
mosaics, the Republic of Cyprus and the Autocephalous Greek-Or-
thodox Church of Cyprus instituted an action in replevin.' 21 Noting
that the applicable limitations period was six years, the court con-
cluded that its decision was not limited by a mechanical application
of the statute of limitation bar. 122 Since Indiana recognized the use
112 Id. The Republic of Cyprus also sent a resolution to the Council of Europe,
mailed letters, addressed symposia, congresses and other such meetings of scholars and
artists, and sent press releases on a routine basis so that the information regarding the
theft was disseminated to journalists, Congressmen, legislative assistants, and individu-
als in academia and archaeology with an interest in Greek and Cypriot affairs. Id.
113 Id. at 1385.
114 Id. at 1381.
115 Id.
116 Id- Goldberg worked with the Dutch art dealer even though she had been told that
the dealer once had been convicted for forging Marc Chagall's signature and that he also
had been sued by an art gallery for failing to fulfill an obligation. Goldberg also knew
that the California attorney represented both the Dutch art dealer and the art dealer,
with whom she was acquainted from Indianapolis, who introduced her to these men. Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 1382.
119 Id.
120 Id
121 Id. at 1385.
122 Id. at 1386.
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of the discovery rule in other contexts, the court applied this rule to
the facts of the case. 123 The court determined that the Republic of
Cyprus and the church had exercised due diligence in their search to
locate and recover the mosaics' 24 and that they did not know and
reasonably could not have known the whereabouts of the mosaics or
the identity of the possessor of the mosaics until 1988.125 There-
fore, since the action accrued in 1988 and the Church and the Re-
public filed their claim in 1989, the claim fell within the six year
statute of limitations.1
26
The recent adherence of the Indiana District Court in Autocepha-
ous to the discovery rule demonstrates the grasp that this doctrine
presently holds on the judiciary when addressing limitations periods
for the recovery of stolen art. At the same time, this case suggests
the need to reevaluate the discovery rule. Indeed, one must ques-
tion whether the discovery rule's sole focus upon the original
owner's actions constitutes the most equitable and efficient method
for determining his right to bring an action to recover stolen
property.
12 7
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. APPARENT ADVANTAGES OF THE DISCOVERY RULE OVER RECENTLY-
ESPOUSED DOCTRINES
Since the recognition of the inherent dangers of mechanically
applying statute of limitation bars, courts have searched for an ap-
123 Id.; see Burks v. Rushmore, 534 N.E.2d 1101 (Ind. 1989); Barnes v. A.H. Robins
Co., Inc., 476 N.E.2d 84 (Ind. 1985). Assuming that the district court had greater exper-
tise in interpreting and applying the law of the state in which it sat, the Seventh Circuit
gave great deference to the district court's resolution of such issues. Autocephalous
Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Fineman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d
278, 288 (7th Cir. 1990). The Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court accu-
rately determined the applicability of the discovery rule in Indiana courts. Id.
124 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus, 717 F. Supp. at 1398.
125 Id. at 1388. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court's determination in
this instance. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit noted that the "evidence... [made] it clear
that, although the Republic of Cyprus may not have contacted all the organizations
Goldberg in hindsight would require, it took substantial and meaningful steps, from the
time it first learned of the disappearance of the mosaics, to locate and recover them."
Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus, 917 F.2d at 290.
126 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus, 717 F. Supp. at 1388. The remainder
of the opinion addressed who properly owned the mosaics. Applying Indiana law, and
even in the alternative Swiss law, the district court determined that defendant Goldberg
never obtained either good title or any right of possession of the mosaics. Id. at 1404.
Accordingly, the court ordered Goldberg to return the mosaics to the Church of Cyprus.
Id.




propriate corollary doctrine to determine whether owners can bring
actions against subsequent bona fide purchasers to recover stolen
art.1 28 The use of the currently espoused doctrine, the discovery
rule, appears at first glance to impede this undesirable result more
effectively than previously employed corollary doctrines such as ad-
verse possession and the demand and refusal rule. Unlike these
prior doctrines, the discovery rule allegedly attaches equitable con-
siderations to the statute of limitations defense by shifting the em-
phasis from the conduct of the possessor to the conduct of the
owner. This shift assures that the law does not frustrate the at-
tempts by the owner to recover stolen art, while still discouraging
the trafficking of stolen art.' 2
9
Proponents of the discovery rule assert that the shift in empha-
sis from the conduct of the possessor to the conduct of the owner
plays a vital role in differentiating the discovery rule from the previ-
ously employed adverse possession doctrine and the demand and
refusal rule. Adverse possession's focus favors the possessor, be-
cause it potentially allows a possessor to obtain tide to an art object
merely because the owner's attempts to recover it have been fruit-
less during the limitations period. Conversely, the discovery rule
allegedly recognizes that courts should not necessarily bar an indi-
vidual kept ignorant of the location of her stolen artwork or the
identity of its possessor from asserting a claim.' 30 By focusing on
the actions of the owner, rather than on those of the possessor, ad-
vocates of the discovery rule claim that the doctrine protects inno-
cent victims by allowing them to retain title to their stolen property
as long as they take appropriate steps to recover it.
Similarly, proponents assert that the discovery rule's shift in
emphasis better protects innocent victims than the demand and re-
fusal rule. Although the demand and refusal rule does not focus
solely upon the actions of the possessor, it centers on the occur-
rence of a particular, arbitrary event.' 3 ' Thus, like the adverse pos-
128 Strictly applying the statute of limitations can create the adverse effect of prohibit-
ing a legal remedy for a meritorious claim when the claimant reasonably could not have
brought an action before the expiration of the applicable limitations period. Comment,
Evolution of Illinois Tort Statutes, supra note 26, at 697. For a more detailed discussion, see
supra note 46 and accompanying text.
129 Partington & Sage, supra note 13, at 412; see O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 497-
98, 416 A.2d 862, 872-73 (1980).
130 Comment, Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 32, at 1157.
131 It has been suggested that the event required for an action to recover stolen prop-
erty to accrue should not be the original owner's demand that the subsequent possessor
return his stolen property, but instead should be the time when the owner had the right
to make such a demand. See Comment, Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 32, at 1136. This
interpretation of the demand requirement also unduly favors the purchaser of stolen art.
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session doctrine, the demand and refusal rule ignores the original
owner's attempts to recover his stolen property. In fact, the de-
mand and refusal rule may encourage possessors to take greater
steps to conceal such property, because concealment further im-
pedes the owner's ability to locate the stolen object and thus de-
mand its return.
Proponents of the discovery rule emphasize that such conceal-
ment does not handicap the possessor's title claim. Unlike the ad-
verse possession doctrine, under the discovery rule the possessor
does not need to fulfill a requirement of open and notorious posses-
sion. The discovery rule does not rely upon an arbitrary event to
establish an owner's right to bring an action in replevin. Since it
varies with the facts of each case, defenders of the discovery rule
assert that the doctrine does not encourage possessors to conceal
art objects and gives owners an opportunity to protect their title
through the exercise of due diligence.1 32
Proponents also have claimed that the discovery rule actively
pursues an equitable solution to the conflict between an owner's
right to recover his stolen property and a possessor's right to repose
through a more comprehensive inquiry into the facts of each case.
Because adverse possession only requires an inquiry into the de-
fendant's possession, it ignores the possibility that the plaintiff at-
tempted to recover his property or failed to pursue productive
avenues of recovery.' 33 Moreover, adverse possession requires that
the defendant prove all of the elements of adverse possession, even
though a substantial lapse of time may have impaired his ability to
gather and produce the necessary evidence. I3 4 Thus, while adverse
possession does not afford a plaintiff the opportunity to take helpful
steps to protect his or her title to a stolen art object, the doctrine's
narrow scope of inquiry also may prevent a defendant from present-
ing conclusive evidence of his or her right to title.
Similarly, the demand and refusal rule suffers from a narrow
scope of inquiry. The only factor relevant to a court's determina-
tion of whether an owner can bring an action against a subsequent
purchaser of his stolen property is the arbitrary time when the
owner demands that the possessor return that property. While the
If the statute of limitations runs from the time that the right to make a demand is com-
plete, the victim's right to make a demand presumably becomes complete when the pur-
chaser's innocent possession begins. The act of "[a]rbitrarily fixing the accrual at this
time fails to recognize that this 'right' is impossible to exercise, since the identity of the
party in possession is unknown." Id. at 1156.
132 See O'Keeffe, 83 NJ. at 499, 416 A.2d at 873.
133 Comment, Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 32, at 1156.
134 Id. at 1157.
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adverse possession doctrine at least considers the defendant's ac-
tions following his receipt of the stolen property, the demand and
refusal rule completely ignores the plaintiff's and defendant's ac-
tions prior to the time of the plaintiff's demand. Hence, under this
rule, courts determine whether an owner has the right to bring an
action without considering such relevant factors as the plaintiff's at-
tempts or failure to pursue his stolen property, or the defendant's
intentional concealment of the property.
Defenders of the discovery rule assert that the doctrine's re-
quirement of a comprehensive inquiry into the facts of each case
shields litigating parties from such potentially inequitable determi-
nations.' 3 5 Since this line of inquiry will vary depending upon the
nature of the theft and subsequent possession, and the value of the
property, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is completely free
from the scrutiny of the court. Considerations of equity may uphold
the limitations bar if the plaintiff has not taken sufficient steps to
recover his property; alternatively, the plaintiff's right to a legal
remedy may defeat the limitations bar if the plaintiff took diligent
steps to recover his property or the defendant took intentional steps
to conceal the stolen object. Thus, proponents declare that the flex-
ibility of the discovery rule not only refuses to favor the possessor
over the owner, but it also may contribute to more conscientious
practices by art owners and purchasers. 3 6
B. CRMICISMS OF THE DISCOVERY RULE
1. The Equitable Problems of Shifting the Focus to the Owner's Actions
Although supporters of the discovery rule assert that the doc-
trine offers a better solution than prior doctrines to the question of
whether owners have the right to bring actions beyond the limita-
tions period, it fails to provide a truly equitable solution. The dis-
covery rule places a tremendous burden upon owners of stolen
property while exposing subsequent bona fide purchasers to suits
15 O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 498, 416 A.2d at 873. For a more detailed discussion of the
discovery rule's method of balancing defendants' and plaintiffs' interests, see supra notes
87-90 and accompanying text.
136 Since the definition of due diligence varies with the facts of each case, defenders of
the discovery rule declare that the doctrine encourages owners and purchasers to take
extra steps to protect their investments. For example, the O'Keeffe court demonstrated
the varying applications of the due diligence requirement:
[w]ith respect to jewelry of moderate value, it may be sufficient if the owner reports
the theft to the police. With respect to art work of greater value, it may be reason-
able to expect an owner to do more. In practice, our ruling should contribute to
more careful practices concerning the purchase of art.
83 NJ. at 499, 416 A.2d at 873.
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which may have been initiated ten, twenty, or even one hundred
years earlier.1 37 As long as an owner fulfills her obligatorily "dili-
gent" search, subsequent possessors may have to defend claims
even though the evidence with which the possessor would vindicate
his title no longer exists.' 38
The likelihood of a possessor's prolonged exposure to a suit
instituted by a true owner depends upon a court's subjective deter-
mination of the facts of the case.' 39 Reliance on this basis presents
problems for both parties. First, possessors generally cannot con-
trol whether the court will allow them to retain title to their
purchases. In some cases, since the court can consider all the rele-
vant evidence, 140 the possessor may prevail. Yet, the discovery rule
generally focuses on the owner's actions. The possessor's lack of
control in this instance presents a problem similar to that faced by
possessors under the adverse possession doctrine.'
4 '
Second, owners do not necessarily know how thorough a search
a court will require to fulfill the discovery rule's due diligence stan-
dard. Courts still have not clarified whether to measure due dili-
gence by an objective standard of reasonableness or by a subjective
assessment that considers a given owner's unique abilities or re-
sources. 142 For example, in DeWeerth, the Second Circuit deter-
mined that the plaintiff, "a wealthy and sophisticated art collector,"
could have retained someone to carry out an extensive investigation
even if she could not have done it herself.' 43 On the other hand, in
O'Keeffe, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered O'Keeffe's deci-
sion to only "discuss[] it with associates in the art world"'144 suffi-
cient to fulfill the due diligence requirement.
145
These disparate determinations demonstrate the discovery
rule's lack of clarity. O'Keeffe certainly possessed the knowledge of
137 Comment, Evolution oflllinois Tort Statutes, supra note 26, at 697.
138 Id.
l39 One legal scholar has developed a theory regarding such subjective, case-by-case
determinations. According to this scholar, judgmental rules consist of inherently flexi-
ble rules developed on an ad hoc basis which can be manipulated by courts to achieve
equitable or economically efficient results. Conversely, mechanical rules consist of rig-
idly applied bright-line rules. The discovery rule is an example of a judgmental rule,
while the statute of limitations is an example of a mechanical rule. See Merrill, Trespass,
Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14J. LEGAL SrUD. 13, 23-24 (1985).
140 See O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 499, 416 A.2d at 873.
141 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
142 Franzese, supra note 88, at 13 n.107.
143 DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1987) (plaintiff had not ful-
filled her obligation to use reasonable diligence in attempting to locate her stolen paint-
ing and thus could not bring an action for its return).




the art world and the sophistication, which the Second Circuit im-
puted to DeWeerth, to at least contact the police. Yet for no dis-
cernable reason, the New Jersey Supreme Court chose not to
impose such a duty upon O'Keeffe.
This lack of clarity and consistency among the various jurisdic-
tions places owners and possessors of stolen art in precarious posi-
tions. To protect her property, an owner may tend to
overcompensate by taking excessive investigatory measures. This
behavior may result in unreasonable expenditures, which would
place a tremendous financial burden on the owner. An owner then
would have to chose between spending vast sums of money con-
ducting a "diligent" search, or forgoing this expense and giving up
the hope of recovering her stolen property. Requiring an innocent
victim of art theft to make such a choice hardly comports with the
discovery rule's intention to provide an equitable solution.
The discovery rule places a possessor in an equally precarious
position because he cannot control an owner's fulfillment of the due
diligence requirement. An owner automatically can fulfill the due
diligence requirement by taking excessive investigatory steps. If the
owner takes such steps, the possessor has no way to counter the
owner's actions and thus retain the item at issue.
Given the possessor's vulnerability to a discovery rule claim, his
best method of assuring continued dominion over an art object is to
conceal it so that no one has the opportunity to recognize the art
object as stolen. This concealment problem actually parallels the
concealment problem fostered by the demand and refusal rule,
which the discovery rule ironically attempts to circumvent. As
under the demand and refusal rule, the possessor's lack of control
over the owner's ability to fulfill the requirements to bring an action
in replevin may motivate him to take extra steps to impede the
owner's ability to locate his stolen property. Thus, an owner's bur-
den of demonstrating a "diligent" effort to recover his property may
create the anomalous result of forcing an owner to choose between
taking excessive investigatory measures or giving up her claim to
her stolen property; similarly, it may encourage a possessor to con-
ceal art objects from the public.
Indeed, the discovery rule fails to promote an equitable method
for addressing the issue of the recovery of stolen art for the same
reason that the previous doctrines failed: the discovery rule favors
one litigating party at the expense of the other. Courts have wres-
tled with the question of which party's actions to focus upon since
their decision that the application of the statute of limitations pro-
vided too arbitrary a solution to the dilemma of whether owners can
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bring action against subsequent purchasers for the recovery of sto-
len property. Thus far, the courts have changed their opinion from
focusing on the possessor under the adverse possession doctrine to
focusing on the owner under the discovery rule. Yet, no strong pol-
icy reason exists to favor either the owner or the possessor. As
much as the courts wish to protect owners against art theft, the
courts also do not wish to discourage individuals from trading and
buying art.
To deter such unwarranted favoritism of either owners or bona
fide purchasers of stolen art objects, courts should establish clearer,
more objective measures for determining whether an owner can
bring an action to recover stolen property from a subsequent pur-
chaser. By relying upon more objective standards, rather than the
subjective standards currently relied upon, parties can tailor their
actions in accordance with the courts' expectations. Thus, an origi-
nal owner will know how to fulfill her obligation to diligently search
for stolen property, and a subsequent purchaser will know how to
take precautions against buying stolen art objects.
One might argue that the courts may encounter difficulties in
establishing more objective standards, because the facts of each case
vary widely. Nonetheless, courts at least can establish objective
guidelines which vary in stringency according the nature and the
value of the property. As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained
in O'Keeffe:
[w]ith respect to jewelry of moderate value, it may be sufficient if the
owner reports the theft to the police. With respect to art work of
greater value, it may be reasonable to expect an owner to do more. In
practice, our ruling should contribute to more careful practices con-
cerning the purchase of art. 14
6
The use of such guidelines would fulfill the dual goals of providing
objective standards upon which parties can rely while still allowing
leeway for the resolution of a broad range of case scenarios.
The most significant objective requirement which courts should
consider is whether potential plaintiffs have contacted law enforce-
ment agencies and art foundations which investigate and dissemi-
nate information on art thefts. Unfortunately, law enforcement
efforts to handle art theft cases have been regarded as fragmentary
and underdeveloped. 147 Similarly, art foundations which collect
and disseminate information on art theft have been considered un-
146 83 N.J. at 499, 416 A.2d at 873.
147 Comment, Recoveyy of StolenArt, supra note 32, at 1125 n.12. For example, the FBI
has a small number of art theft specialists. However, their work cannot help many art
theft victims, because the FBI's jurisdiction is limited to the investigation of the inter-
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organized and inefficient.' 48
Although such efforts have been criticized in the past, these
agencies have made great strides in recent years. The International
Criminal Police Organization's ("INTERPOL") art program main-
tains records on stolen objects through a computerized case-track-
ing system.' 49 This system enables INTERPOL to store and
retrieve data on stolen art objects so that they can disseminate such
information to interested parties, as well as carry out their own in-
vestigations.' 50 Furthermore, INTERPOL also publishes a biannual
poster, "The Twelve Most Wanted Works of Art," which features
photographs of stolen objects accompanied by vital information
written in French and English. 151 INTERPOL distributes these pos-
ters to law enforcement agencies, art-theft archives, art publications,
major museum, and police departments in all INTERPOL-member
countries.
52
Art foundations have made similar advances in gathering and
disseminating information about stolen art. The Art Dealers Associ-
ation of America, Inc., a non-profit organization of select art deal-
ers, established an extensive archive of stolen art in 1971.153
Likewise, the International Foundation for Art Research ("IFAR")
established an inventory of stolen art in 1975.15
Since law enforcement agencies and art foundations are readily
available to provide costless methods of pursuing one's stolen prop-
erty, reporting an art theft to such an agency should fulfill an
owner's obligation of diligence under the discovery rule. Reporting
thefts to the appropriate agency demonstrates the desire to recover
and retain title to one's property, and may hasten the owner's recov-
ery of her property.' 55
The use of law enforcement agencies and art registries also
benefits potential purchasers of stolen art, because they provide
state transport of stolen art objects valued in excess of $5,000. Id-; see Feldman & Burn-
ham, supra note 96.
148 Comment, Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 32, at 1125 n.12.
149 Note, Title Disputes in the Art Market: An Emerging Duty of Care for Art Merchants, 51




153 Id. at 459.
154 Id. at 461.
155 Reporting art thefts to the appropriate agency, particularly art foundations with
art registries, also serves other functions. For example, registries also may serve as a
warranty of title from a seller. See Dickson, The Need for a National Registry of Cultural




purchasers with a means of verifying the title of a particular object.
Given that the courts would require an owner to register stolen art
objects to satisfy the due diligence requirement, a subsequent pur-
chaser could feel confident in the validity of his tide to an art object
as long as it had not been registered as stolen. The registration of
stolen art objects benefits both original owners and subsequent pur-
chasers, and imposes no costs on either party. Hence, this require-
ment does not violate equitable considerations by favoring one
party at the expense of the other.
Requiring art theft victims to comply with such an objective
standard of diligence in searching for their stolen property will en-
courage continuity in courts' decisions. Using more objective crite-
ria also will discourage owners from overcompensating when
conducting diligent searches as they may feel the need to do under
subjective criterion. 156 Courts should require wealthy and know-
ledgeable art collectors, as well as average buyers or investors, to
exert the same effort to be eligible to bring a claim to recover their
stolen property. Courts still may consider the facts of each case in
order to tailor their decision, but, to the extent possible, relying on
objective criteria better warns owners and possessors of the courts'
likely expectations.1 5
7
2. The Inefficiency of Focusing Solely upon the Owner's Actions
The discovery rule also fails to provide an efficient method for
determining whether an owner can bring an action against a subse-
quent purchaser of his stolen property. The discovery rule places
the burden of proof entirely on the owner. It does not place a simi-
lar duty of diligence on the subsequent possessor who, innocently
156 See supra III.B.
157 While this article was in preparation, an article appeared in the New York Univer-
sity Law Review which also recognized the need for clearer requirements under the due
diligence standard. Comment, DeWeerth v. Baldinger: Making New York a Haven for Stolen'
Art?, 64 N.Y.U.L. REV. 909, 943 (1989). That article also suggested that individuals
could fulfill the requirements of the due diligence standard by contacting authorities. Id.
However, the article advocated reliance upon a demand and refusal rule, id. at 942, be-
cause it questioned the value of relying upon relatively new art registries. Id. at 941.
Although this concern is an issue worth addressing, as noted previously, art registries
are developing rapidly. Furthermore, the value of requiring a theft victim to contact
such registries goes well beyond the actual recovery of the art object; it demonstrates
the original owner's intent to seek the recovery of his property. As we have seen in cases
such as O'Keeffe, the fact that one's efforts were fruitless is irrelevant to the determination
of whether that person has met the standard for due diligence. For a more thorough
discussion of the development and value of requiring registration with art foundations
and law enforcement agencies, see supra notes 147-155 and accompanying text.
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or not, actually has trafficked in stolen art.158 By failing to place a
reciprocal duty on the purchaser, courts fail to employ a valuable
resource which might discourage the theft and resale of art, deter
the illegal possession of art, and secure the return of stolen property
to its rightful owner.
Purchasers of valuable art often are either art dealers or individ-
uals who employ art dealers to carry out their transactions. Such
individuals often are in a better position than original owners to
stop the transfer of stolen art objects, because they have the oppor-
tunity to investigate the validity of the object's title before purchas-
ing it.' 59 A purchaser has the opportunity to inspect the art object,
meet the seller and question him as to how he acquired the object,
and check art and law enforcement registries of stolen art. Con-
versely, an art owner faces the overwhelming obstacle of investigat-
ing the theft of their often hidden or disguised property.
Purchasers of art have another tool at their disposal to prevent
the transfer of stolen art which is not available to original owners. A
purchaser has the opportunity to consider the circumstances of the
sale to determine whether the art is stolen. For example, in Auto-
cephalous, the defendant knew that the art dealer who told her about
the Byzantine mosaics had been convicted for forging an artist's sig-
nature and sued for failing to pay an art gallery. 160 Rather than
questioning the art dealer's credibility, the defendant employed him
to act as a middleman for her purchase. 16 1 The defendant also re-
lied upon that art dealer's attorney to determine the validity of the
mosaics' export papers. 162 She accepted the attorney's determina-
tion even though one might question the plausibility of the seller's
explanation for his possession. 163 Even after inspecting the mosa-
ics, the defendant did not think to verify the validity of the seller's
title, although the objects obviously were extremely old and valua-
ble.lM4 Particularly given that the defendant was an art dealer, one
158 O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 512, 416 A.2d 862, 878 (1980) (Handier, J.,
dissenting).
159 Moore, supra note 14, at 480. Art dealers should be able to verify successfully the
validity of an object's tide. Because of their expertise in the art field, dealers fairly can
be held to a higher standard of care in such cases than private purchasers. Wertheimer,
The Implications of the O'Keeffe Case, 6 ART & LAW 44, 46 n.105 (1981).
160 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1381 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
161 Id. at 1382.
162 Id.
163 The seller supposedly found the mosaics in the rubble of an "extinct" church in
northern Cyprus while serving there as a Turkish archaeologist. Id. at 1381.
164 Id. at 1382. The defendant did testify that
[s]he inquired as to whether the mosaics had been reported as stolen or missing and
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must question why the defendant ignored the suspicious back-
grounds of the parties in such an unusual sale.
One would think that the extremely suspicious circumstances of
this sale would put the purchaser, particularly a purchaser who is an
art dealer, on notice that the seller was not the true owner of the
mosaics. Even if the purchaser was not put on notice, it is not un-
reasonable to expect that the suspicious circumstances surrounding
the sale at least would raise a doubt as to the seller's rightful posses-
sion, calling for further verification before consummating the
purchase. 165 While no court has required purchasers of art to fulfill
a duty of due diligence, the Seventh Circuit recently noted that art
purchasers faced with circumstances as suspicious as those faced by
Goldberg in Autocephalous "would do best to do more than make a
few last minute phone calls" to protect their purchase. 166 Hence,
the imposition of a reciprocal duty of diligence under the discovery
rule would encourage subsequent purchasers, such as Goldberg, to
take note and investigate aspects of the transaction that call the
seller's title into doubt.
Since purchasers have different resources and more opportuni-
ties to investigate the validity of an art object's title, a more efficient
method of determining whether an owner has the right to sue a sub-
sequent purchaser would be to retain the discovery rule's investiga-
tory duty on the owner and add a reciprocal investigatory duty on
the purchaser. Courts would consider both the owner's as well as
whether any applicable treaties might prevent the mosaics from being imported into
the United States. She testified that she contacted, by telephone, [IFAR] in New
York and UNESCO's office in Geneva. [The defendant also] claims she telephoned
customs offices in the United States, Germany, Switzerland, and Turkey.
Id. Although the court did not discuss the validity of the defendant's claims, they seem
implausible. The defendant allegedly contacted several of the same organizations to
whom the Republic of Cyprus reported the theft of the mosaics. Yet, the defendant
claims to have obtained no information regarding this theft. Id.
For a more thorough discussion of the suspicious circumstances of the sale of the
mosaics, see id. at 1400-02.
165 See Porter v. Wertz, 68 A.D.2d 141, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1st Dept. 1979). The court
noted that the purchaser made no effort to verify that the seller was the true owner of an
Utrillo painting or that he was authorized by the owner to sell the painting. Id. at 146,
416 N.Y.S.2d at 257. The court argued that although the listing of the Utrillo in a cata-
logue of the artist's work may not have been enough to put the purchaser on notice that
the seller was no the true owner, it could have raised a doubt as to the seller's rightful
possession, calling for further investigation before purchasing the painting. Id. at 147,
416 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
166 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Fineman Fine
Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 294 (7th Cir. 1990). The court recommended that in such
suspicious cases, purchasers could "(and probably should) take steps such as a formal
IFAR search; a documented authenticity check by disinterested experts; a full back-
ground search of the seller and his claim of title; insurance protection and a contingency
sales contract; and the like." Id.
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the possessor's actions in their determination of whether the statute
of limitations should be tolled. In this, manner, both parties must
take affirmative steps to avoid the sale of stolen property. Purchas-
ers will not risk buying objects of questionable origin, because
courts will view such a purchase as a violation of the purchaser's
investigative duty. At the same time, owners will continue to search
for their stolen property, because courts will consider the owner's
diligence in searching for his property.
Along with increasing the likelihood of discovering a stolen ob-
ject's whereabouts and that object's resale, placing a reciprocal duty
on purchasers would serve the additional function of discouraging
the art theft market as a whole. In fact, the most effective means of
slowing the art theft rate is placing liability on buyers for purchasing
stolen objects. 167 Thus far, focusing on the prosecution of thieves
and fences has proven an ineffective method of slowing the stolen
property industry. Focusing on the prosecution of thieves has been
ineffective because individual crimes are costly and arduous to
solve. Furthermore, the prosecution of thieves does not lesson the
economic motivation for theft, because it ignores the market for sto-
len goods.168 Focusing on the prosecution of sellers of stolen prop-
erty (fences) also has been ineffective, because they also are difficult
to convict. Sellers often can plausibly explain their possession
through bills of sale, they rarely have prior criminal records, and
prosecutors cannot use evidence of a seller's bad reputation unless
the defense raises the issue.169 Given such roadblocks, the place-
ment of a reciprocal investigatory duty on purchasers of art may
help to curb the tremendous rise in art thievery, which the prosecu-
tion of thieves and fences has failed to curtail. .
Deterring secondary purchasers better thwarts the stolen prop-
erty industry, because it substantially reduces the thieves' and sell-
ers' incentive and the opportunity to traffic in stolen works.
Holding purchasers accountable for possessing stolen property will
encourage them to take greater steps to investigate the validity of
titles. Purchasers will become wary of buying goods with questiona-
ble tiles because they will run the risk of having to relinquish the
object to its rightful owner.' 70 Particularly with respect to valuable
167 Moore, supra note 14, at 478.
168 Note, Property Theft Enforcement and the Criminal Secondary Purchaser of Stolen Goods, 89
YALE L.J. 1225, 1230 (1980).
169 j. HALL, THErT, LAW, AND SocIm'r 189-90 (2d ed. 1952).
170 A purchaser who has relied upon an art merchant to investigate an object's title
will have recourse against that merchant should the investigation fail to discover the
original owner's valid right to the object. See Gerstenbluth, Picture Imperfect: Attempted
Regulation of the Art Market, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 501,505 (1988). In Menzel for exam-
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art objects, buyers will stand to lose a tremendous amount of money
if they must return their purchases to the true owners. Since art
buyers will take greater care in investigating their purchases, they
will reduce their number of purchases from suspicious sellers. This
drop in sales, in turn, will decrease thieves' and sellers' incentives to
continue their illegal activity. Thus, placing a reciprocal duty on
purchasers provides the most effective method of deterring art theft,
as well as increasing the efficiency of courts' determinations whether
owners can sue subsequent bona fide purchasers of their stolen
property beyond the limitations period.
171
3. Statutory and Common Law Considerations
A final problem with the discovery rule, and its focus upon the
true owner's actions, is that it conflicts with a fundamental common
law and statutory tenet.' 72 Under the common law, "a bona fide
purchaser of personal property taken tortiously or wrongfully, as by
trespass or theft, does not acquire a title good against the true
owner."' 173 The codification of the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") has not changed this legal axiom.
174
pie, the defendant possessor impleaded the gallery from whom he bought the art object
claiming a breach of the implied warranty of good title. Menzel v. List, 22 A.D.2d 647,
253 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1st Dept. 1964), on remand, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup.
Ct. 1966), modified on other grounds, 28 A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1st Dept. 1967),
modification reu'd, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 94, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979, 980, 246 N.E.2d 742, 743 (1969).
The Court placed the full burden of investigation of the state of the art object's tide on
the gallery. Id. As a result of such cases, art merchants increasingly have insisted on
guarantees of the authenticity and/or authorship of art objects they sell. Gerstenbluth,
this note, at 531. Although such practices appear relatively generous, such guarantees
come with limitations on liability and damages. Id.
171 For a general discussion of thwarting the stolen property industry by deterring
secondary purchasers, see Chamberlain, Anti-Fence Legislation, 14 A.B.A. J. 517 (1928).
172 Indeed, the discovery rule's conflict with the legal notion that a thief cannot ac-
quire tide to stolen property exemplifies the conflict faced by all the corollary doctrines
employed thus far to overcome the mechanical application of the statute of limitations
bar. Only the application of a purely mechanical rule could overcome this conflict. For
a more detailed discussion of mechanical and judgmental rules, see supra note 139.
173 Kutner Buick, Inc. v. Strelecki, 111 N.J. Super. 89, 97, 267 A.2d 549, 554 (Ch. Div.
1970); accordJoseph v. Lesnevich, 56 NJ. Super. 340, 153 A.2d 349 (App. Div. 1959).
The courts have firmly established the principle that a thief cannot convey title as against
a true owner. See, e.g., Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557 (1880); Silsbury v. McCoon, 3
N.Y. 379 (1850); Menzel, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979, 246 N.E.2d 742; Heckle v.
Lurvey, 101 Mass. 344 (1869).
174 O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 514, 416 A.2d 862, 881 (1980) (Handler, J., dis-
senting). The Uniform Commercial Code "assumes the continuing existence of a large
body of pre-Code and non-Code law on which it rests for support, which it displaces to
the least possible extent, and without which it could not survive." Gilmore, Article 9:
What is Does for the Past, 26 LA. L. REv. 285, 285-86 (1966); seeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2, at 6 (1972).
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From this legal axiom it follows that as between the true owner
who has had her property stolen and a subsequent bona fide pur-
chaser, the true owner is entitled to the goods.' 7 5 The true owner
retains title to the object, because the thief who sold the chattel to
the innocent purchaser had no title to give. 176 Courts consistently
have applied this axiom in ownership claims over artistic works be-
tween true owners and subsequent possessors.' 77
Even though this tenet pervades the law, courts have not ad-
dressed the discovery rule's inconsistency with it.178 Courts have
ignored the inconsistency between giving the possessor title to a
stolen object when the original owner fails to diligently search for it
and the tenet that such a purchaser cannot obtain valid title to a
stolen object because the thief never possessed a valid title which he
could transfer to the purchaser. For example, the O'Keeffe court
merely recommended that purchasers inquire whether a work of art
has been reported as lost or stolen. 179 It failed to discuss the effect
of a purchase having been stolen on the buyer's right to possession.
The district court in Autocephalous did not give this issue even the
O'Keeffe court's cursory consideration.' 80
Regardless of the courts' failure to address the issue, this bla-
175 O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 514, 416 A.2d at 881 (Handler, J., dissenting).
176 Kutner Buick, 111 N.J. Super. at 97, 267 A.2d at 553.
177 See, e.g., Porter, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 259, 68 A.D.2d at 149 (true owners of Utrillo paint-
ing could recover the painting or damages against the defendant gallery, which
purchased the painting from an individual who had acquired it wrongfully from another,
who was not authorized by the owner to sell it); Lieber v. Mohawk Arms, Inc., 314
N.Y.S.2d 510, 512, 64 Misc. 2d 206, 208 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (owner of Hider's personal
effects could recover these items stolen from him by transferor to bona fide purchaser).
178 Justice Handler of the NewJersey Supreme Court is one of the few judges who has
addressed the incompatibility of the discovery rule doctrine and this basic legal tenet.
O'Keeffe, 83 NJ. at 513-16, 416 A.2d at 878-82 (Handler, J., dissenting). Justice Handler
argued:
if we were to view this record as presenting only the undisputed fact that the paint-
ings were stolen and could thus not be validly transferred thereafter to [the defend-
ant] as a bona fide purchaser, plaintiff O'Keeffe would clearly be entitled to prevail.
Id. at 515, 416 A.2d at 882.
179 Id. at 498-99, 416 A.2d at 873.
180 See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D.Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
However, in his concurrence, Judge Cudahy of the Seventh Circuit favored reliance
upon the legal notion that the statute of limitations should not run against an original
owner who lacks the facts necessary to institute a suit, as long as the property was held
by the original thief or by a subsequent holder acting in bad faith. Autocephalous Greek-
Orthodox Church of Cyprus, 917 F.2d at 294 (Cudahy, J., concurring). Applying such a
good faith requirement to the facts in the instant case, he concluded that the defendant
was not a bona fide purchaser with good tide to the mosaics at issue, because she under-
took "only a cursory inquiry into [the seller's] ability to convey good title under circum-




tant inconsistency leaves the viability of the discovery rule in ques-
tion. Following the established doctrine that thieves cannot obtain
title to goods which they have stolen, courts do not need to place
the burden of proving one's right to bring a claim on a true owner
of stolen art, because the subsequent possessor has no legal right to
that property. Since a subsequent possessor does not have title to
the stolen art object, an owner automatically has the right to bring
an action for its recovery.'
8 '
Denial of the owner's right to bring an action hardly comports
with the discovery rule's desire to resolve the issue of the right to
sue in an equitable fashion. One must question whether the courts
can reconcile this conflict, because courts probably will not wish to
punish good faith purchasers for accidentally buying stolen art, nor
will they wish to protect purchasers by granting thieves the right to
pass the title of such stolen goods. Thus, regardless of the previ-
ously noted shortcomings of the discovery rule, unless courts can
ameliorate the doctrine's inconsistency with the well-established
tenet that thieves cannot pass title, they rightfully cannot apply this
doctrine to determine whether an owner can bring an action against
a subsequent purchaser.
V. CONCLUSION
Although proponents of the discovery rule claim that the doc-
trine presents a more equitable alternative to prior doctrines, in its
present state, courts should not rely upon it to determine whether
an owner has the right to bring an action against a 'ubsequent pos-
sessor of his stolen property. Even if the courts can reconcile the
rule's conflict with the legal axiom that a thief cannot pass title, the
discovery rule still does not provide the equitable determination
that it supposedly promotes and does not provide an efficient
method of investigating tides to art objects or discouraging art theft.
A better method for making this determination would be to impose
a duty, based on objective criteria, on true owners to search for their
stolen art and to impose a reciprocal duty on buyers to investigate
the validity of the title to their purchases. This method would as-
sure that courts consider both owners and the purchasers' interests.
It also would encourage owners and purchasers to take more pre-
181 Several defenses are available to defendants, including the equitable defenses of
laches, unclean hands, estoppel or mistake. See O'Keeffe, 83 NJ. at 516, 416 A.2d at 883
(Handler, J., dissenting).
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cautionary measures which would help curb the art theft industry
which runs rampant today.
LEAH E. EISEN
